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Eugene Thomas Long 
Lord Gifford and his Lectures: The First Year (1888-1889) 
During the academic session, 1888-1889, the first 
Gifford Lectures in natural theology were delivered at 
three of the then four Scottish Universities, Edinburgh, 
Glasgow and Saint Andrews. During the following year the 
first Aberdeen lectures were given. Now one hundred years 
and more than 150 lecturers later, the Gifford Lectures are 
recognized by many as the most distinguished lecture series 
in the world. Lecturers have come from many different fields 
as the names James Frazer, Werner Heisenberg, Arnold Toynbee, 
Albert Schv,pitzer, Josiah Royce and Rudolf Bultmann suggest 
and most of the lectures have been published. 
Some of the published versions of the lectures such as 
William James' The Varieties 0/ Religious Experience and 
Alfred North Whitehead's Process and Reality have become 
classics in the field of natural theology. Many of the 
lecturers have been intent on advancing the field of natural 
theology. Others such as the philosopher A.J. Ayer and the 
theologian Karl Barth have been mainly critical of the 
enterprise of natural theology. Some of the lectures .lay now 
be looked upon as period pieces. Many, however, represent 
important contributions to the field and the Gifford 
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Lectures have helped keep the subject alive when the whole 
concept of natural theology was being challenged by both 
philosophers and theologians. 
The Gifford Lectures were established by the will of 
Lord Adam Gifford, an Edinburgh solicitor and judge, who at 
his death in 1887 bequeathed the sum of 80,000 pounds for 
lectureships in natural theology at the four Scottish 
universities. Although in ancient times, natural theology 
tended to be contrasted with civil theology, more typically 
natural theology is contrasted with revealed theology. In 
both cases, however, natural theology refers to general 
reflection on religion independent of appeals to special 
revelation or the authority of a particular history or 
tradition. One might say that in the broadest sense natural 
theology attempts to build bridges between secular and 
religious views of self and world. 
Gifford was neither a philosopher nor a theologian, but 
he did display a keen interest in intellectual questions 
about religion and lectured to various literary and 
philosophical societies on topics ranging from Ralph Waldo 
Emerson to Jurisprudence to Hinduism. He read ancient and 
modern philosophy as well as poetry and while suffering from 
paralysis during the last seven years of his life, he was 
absorbed in the study of western and non-western systems of 
philosophy and religion. He made no secret of the fact that 
his studies had led him to surrender some beliefs which he 
had been reared to consider essential to Christian faith. 
His own attitudes towards religion are summarized in one of 
his papers on Emerson where he writes: 
The truth is, that although in education and 
elsewhere we may try to separate secular from sacred, 
and provide time-tables and conscience clauses and so 
on, religion will not be separated from anything 
whatever. It will penetrate every cranny and pervade 
every space, and it will flow around and through every 
su b ject and every su bstance like electricity.l 
That Gifford was interested in drawing connections 
between ordinary and scientific views of the world on the 
one hand and religious views on the other is manifested in 
the directions that he gave for the establishment of the 
lectures. According to his will, natural theology was to be 
conceived in the widest sense. The lecturers were directed 
to "treat their subject as a strictly natural science, the 
greatest of all possible sciences, indeed, in one sense the 
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only science, that of Infinite Being, without reference to 
or reliance upon any supposed exceptional or so-called 
miraculous revelation." Further the lecturers were not to be 
subjected to any test of belief. The lecturers could be of 
any denomination or of none; they could be religious or of 
no religion. It was only required that they be "able, 
reverent men, true thinkers, sincere lovers of and earnest 
inquirers after truth." The lectures were also to be public 
and open to the whole community. 
At the time of the first Gifford Lectures, natural 
theology in Great Britain generally referred to the 
traditional arguments for the existence of God as 
exemplified in the work of William Paley. But developments 
in the empirical sciences and in the empirical type of 
philosophy which dominated British thought in the eighteenth 
and well into the nineteenth centuries had called natural 
theology in this form into question. The latter part of the 
eighteenth century and the first three quarters of the 
nineteenth century were dominated by empirical and 
scientific attitudes arising from scientific research and 
philosophical discussions of the nature of knowledge. The 
work of such scientists as John Dalton, Michael Faraday, and 
John Joule had resulted in a new and more comprehensive 
vision of the material world. And the work of Lamark, Darwin 
and others emphasized the natural development of the species 
from more primitive forms. 
The idea of evolution, as is well known, was not unique 
to Darwin. Indeed, one year prior to the publication of 
Origin of the Species, the philosopher, Herbert Spencer, had 
drawn up a plan for A System of Synthetic Philosophy based 
on the idea of progress or evolution. But it was the 
extensive research of Darwin that gave empirical grounding 
to the theory of evolution and the work of Huxley brought 
evolutionary theory to the attention of the general public. 
Because of such developments which tended to lend support to 
materialistic theories of reality, it became increasingly 
difficult during the second half of the nineteenth century 
to find a place for the world of the spiritual. Herbert 
Spencer attempted to do sO,but his more positivistic frame 
of mind could make a place for the spiritual only in the 
realm of the unknowable. 
Empirical methodologies, however, were not limited to 
the sciences. Following the Protestant revolution and its 
challenge of the authority of the Church in religious 
matters, the Bible, understood as the infallible and 
essentially self-interpreting revelation of divine truth, 
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had become for many the final authority in religious 
matters. This belief survived into the eighteenth century 
until it was challenged by historical and critical 
approaches to the Biblical textS.In the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, first on the continent and then in 
Britain, Biblical scholars challenged some of the factual 
claims of the Biblical texts, pointed to parallel texts in 
other traditions, showed that many texts were written and 
edited later than had been supposed, and pointed to 
inconsistencies in the Biblical record. In 1860, controversy 
was created in England when some Anglican churchmen argued 
in Essays and Reviews that the Bible should be treated as any 
other book. And the 1875 edition of Encyclopedia Britannica 
carried an article by the Scottish Free Church scholar, W. 
Roberston Smith, arguing a similar theme. Smith and other 
Scottish Biblical scholars were thoroughly familar with 
Biblical scholarship on the continent but this article 
brought this to the attention of the general public. Smith 
was tried for heresy and in 1881 was dismissed from his 
Chair at Aberdeen. 
Concurrent with the development of the historical and 
critical approach to the Biblical sources was a rapid growth 
in the knowledge of other cultures and religions resulting 
from philosophical, historical and anthropological studies. 
Stimulated by the idea of human evolution and challenges to 
the Biblical story of creation, attention was given to the 
scientific description and interpretation of various peoples 
and cultures and this led to increased awareness of diverse 
religious traditions. Efforts were made to trace 
historically the evolution of religious concepts and 
comparisons were drawn between the Judaeo-Christian and the 
so-called primitive religions. These studies often 
challenged Christian claims to uniqueness and authority. It 
is no accident that among the early Gifford lecturers were 
several anthropologists and historians of religion. 
The empirical philosophy of Locke, Berkeley and Hume had 
for the most part dominated British philosophy in the 
eighteenth and well into the nineteenth centuries, John 
Stuart Mill being its leading nineteenth century 
representative. This approach to philosophy often presented 
challenges to natural and revealed theology. John Locke had 
divided ideas into two kinds, sensation and reflection. The 
ideas of sensation were said to come through the senses and 
the ideas of reflection were derived from the mind's 
observations of its own operations on ideas presented in 
sensation. This meant that all ideas are derived from the 
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senses and these ideas were said to be caused by things 
external to the mind. Ideas stand for or represent things 
existing in the world. 
Bishop Berkeley argued that Locke's position separated 
ideas from the reality of things and that this led to 
scepticism about our perception or understanding of real 
things in ordinary as well as religious knowledge. The way 
to overcome this scepticism said Berkeley was to accept that 
what we know are our ideas and that what we call an object 
is actually an idea or a collection of ideas. Things exist 
in their being perceived. According to Berkeley, Locke's 
speaking of objects independent of our ideas of objects could 
only lead to confusion and meaningless claims since 
ultimately Locke's objects are unknown and unknowable. The 
Scottish philosopher, David Hume, was to take this position 
even further arguing that on Locke's view there was also no 
reason for accepting belief in an independent mind. Hume's 
well known Dialogues on Natural Religion also called 
into question the traditional arguments for the existence of 
God and challenged much that had been treated under the 
heading of natural theology. 
The Scottish School of Common Sense represented best by 
Thomas Reid was seen by many to offer an alternative to the 
subjective idealism of Berkeley and the empirical scepticism 
of Hume and the tendency of both to separate self from world 
and God. On Reid's account we cannot prove, but nevertheless 
are forced to believe by the constitution of our nature that 
what we perceive are things existing independently of mind. 
On the same grounds, he argued, we are forced to believe in 
self-identity and other minds. To deny these beliefs is to 
engage in the absurd. Although Reid did not hold that these 
beliefs depended on belief in God, he did maintain that the 
explanation of our common sense beliefs depended upon our 
nature being constituted by God. Reid's position places great 
weight on belief in a fundamental constituition of ourselves 
and did not satisfy many who sought a more secure 
foundation for overcoming the sceptical tendencies of the 
age. Another Scot, Sir William Hamilton, sought to overcome 
some of the problems in Reid's thought but his Kantian 
emphasis upon the Absolute as unknowable placed even more 
burden upon belief and in the eyes of some led to another 
form of scepticism. 
At the time of the first Gifford Lectures then, many of 
the intellectual supports for religious faith seemed to have 
been called into question and scepticism was a dominant 
mood. Consciousness of self appeared to be divorced from 
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consciousness of the external world. Religious consciousness 
or consciousness of the Infinite was divorced from 
consciousness of the finite and the religious was divorced 
from the secular. The older traditon of natural theology had 
been called into Question by Hume, Kant and others and the 
prospects for natural theology seemed dim. However, some new 
intellectual forces were in the wind in Scotland and we get 
some insight into these forces in the first year of the 
Gifford Lectures. 
Of the first Gifford Lecturers, two were Scots, Andrew 
Lang being among them.2 Lang was born in 1844 in Selkirk 
and spent his earliest years reading folk tales and roaming 
the hills in the borderlands of Scotland. Said to be 
somewhat bookish in nature, he was sent at age ten to the 
Edinburgh Academy and in 1861 he enrolled in Saint Andrews 
University. Along the way he read among others the works of 
Scott, Pope, Dickens, and Longfellow. After reading Homer 
he also developed an intense interest in classical learning 
and in his later years he translated the Iliad and the 
Odyssey and published several books on Homer. Early in 1863 
he left Saint Andrews for Glasgow University where he hoped 
to Qualify for a Snell Exhibition at Balliol College, 
Oxford. This goal was achieved and in the Michaelmas term of 
1864, he matriculated at Balliol. The idealist philosopher, 
T.H. Green, served as Lang's tutor and Lang developed a deep 
respect and affection for the classical scholar, Benjamin 
Jowett, which lasted long after Lang left Oxford. 
Little is known about Lang's seven years at Merton 
College where he was elected a Probationer in 1868 but 
records show that he was reading anthropology as well as 
literature. Lang was particularly attracted to the 
anthropological work of Edward Burnett Tylor although in his 
Gifford Lectures he would challenge Tylor's claim that 
animism was the foundation from which all religion 
developed. In 1875 Lang moved to London to follow a 
journalistic career and he spent the remainder of his life 
there. 
Andrew Lang wrote on many diverse subjects representing 
his wide range of interests. In addition to many reviews, 
essays and poems, Lang was a pioneer in comparative 
anthropology, a field that at this time was for the most 
part investigated outside the realm of university supported 
subjects. Lang's approach to anthropology was less 
scientific in the strict sense and was rooted in literature 
and folklore, an interest that can be traced back to his 
boyhood days in Selkirk. He was a founder and early 
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president of the Folk-Lore Society but he was also a 
founding member of the Society for Psychical Research, an 
organization that counted among its members many leading 
philosophers and psychologists. These two interests, 
anthropology and psychical research , form the immediate 
background to his Gifford Lectures delivered at Saint 
Andrews during the 1888-1889 academic session. 
Much of Lang's work in anthropology was of a polemical 
nature and his Gifford Lectures continue in that tradition. 
In the published version of his lectures, The Making of 
Religion, he begins by summarizing the conclusion which he 
says is presented by the field of the History of Religions 
with an air of authority: 
Man derived the conception of 'spirit' or 'soul' 
from his reflections on the phenomena of sleep, dreams, 
death, shadows, and from the experience of trances and 
hallucinations. Worshipping first the departed souls of 
his kindred, man later extended the doctrine of 
spiritual beings in many directions. Ghosts, or other 
spiritual existences fashioned in the same lines, 
prospered till they became gods. Finally, as the result 
of a variety of processes, one of these gods became 
supreme, and, at last was regarded as the one only 
God. Meanwhile man retained his belief in the existence 
of his own soul, surviving after the death of the body, 
and so reached the conception of immortality. Thus the 
ideas of God and of the soul are the result of early 
fallacious reasonings about misunderstood 
experiences. S 
Lang's Gifford Lectures challenged the received wisdom 
of the History of Religions on two accounts. First he calls 
into question the materialistic conception of reality which 
he believed to dominate much of the work in this field. By a 
method of comparing the customs and manners of civilized 
races with those of so-called primitive or savage races, he 
attempts to show that such supernormal experiences as 
clairvoyance, thought transference, and telepathy cannot be 
easily dismissed as mere fables. These kinds of 
experiences;he argues, may represent just the kind of facts 
on which the primitive doctrine of soul may be based. 
Second, by collecting and comparing accounts of the high 
gods and creative beings believed in by most primitive 
tribes, Lang challenges the received view that the 
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conception of god is derived from or evolved from reflections 
on spirits and ghosts of ancestors. 
Lang makes it clear that he is dealing with probable 
explanations, but he is intent on challenging what he 
considers to be a dogmatic presentation and discussion of 
the origins of religion which overlooks or ignores available 
evidence. If his two arguments can be sustained, the 
standard view, even if supported by leading scholars, will 
have to be reconsidered. Lang acknowledges that his first 
thesis goes against the grain of contemporary scientific and 
materialistic views and that he can at best provide a 
probable explanation of the data. But he argues that his two 
theses are independent of each other and that even if the 
first is rejected as improbable, the second, based on 
evidence of a different kind, might still be maintained. 
Lang is careful to say that reports of supernormal 
experiences should not be accepted without careful analysis. 
He believes, however, that Tylor and other anthropologists 
reject such reports out of hand and in violation of 
procedures followed in anthropological studies. Usually 
anthropologists follow the test of the recurrence of similar 
reports in different and unrelated places and ages as a 
means for judging the value of the evidence. In his study 
Lang collects stories of primitive beliefs about visions, 
hallucinations and so on which are associated with claims to 
knowledge not obtainable through normal channels of sense 
knowledge. He then compares these with similar stories among 
living and highly educated peoples. In this way he proposes 
to study what he calls the X region of human nature, the 
region of miracles, prophecy and visions which is associated 
with the major religions and major religious leaders. 
Lang argues, for example, that clairvoyance or what the 
Zulus call "opening the gates of distance" is widely 
reported in diverse cultures and ages and that this ability 
to have knowledge of events remote to the knower is 
attributed to many, including many saints. We may not be 
able to confirm or deny primitive explanations of such 
experiences in terms of wandering spirits. But we might be 
able to understand how primitive man arrived at such beliefs 
or explanations and how he might have found confirmation for 
such beliefs in other supernormal experiences. Further, 
argues Lang, if we cannot totally discount reports of 
clairvoyance which have been sifted through a well educated 
and modern intelligence we are in no position to dismiss 
primitive data out of hand just because it conflicts with 
the prevailing theory of materialism. Indeed such experiences 
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may provide evidence that the idea of the spiritual is 
rooted in actual experiences and that the materialistic 
account of man and world is less than adequate. 
Lang's second and perhaps more important argument 
addresses the question of the origins of the ideas of the 
gods. On the standard account, the idea of ghosts arises 
from dreams and visions. From this, based on erroneous 
reasoning, man is said to have developed the ideas of higher 
spirits, then gods, then higher gods and finally the belief 
that there exists only one supreme god. On this account 
primitive tribes had no belief in a supreme being or higher 
god. The idea of god was a later development evolving from 
nature spirits and the culture of ancestor worship. Lang 
challenges this view of Tylor, HuxleY,Spencer and others. 
Based on his study of several primitive and remote 
cultures,Lang argues that the conception of a supreme moral 
being occurs in societies where ancestor worship does not 
occur and that some of these societies are as monotheistic as 
the Christian societies. 
To develop his point, Lang examines in some detail 
several religions of the most remote and primitive races, 
those least contaminated by Judaeo-Christian or Islamic 
teaching. Among the Fuegians, for example, Lang reports the 
concept of a magnified, non-natural man, who walks about in 
the woods and mountains, who knows every word and action, 
who cannot be escaped and who influences the weather in 
accordance with man's conduct. His moral standard is much 
above that of the ordinary person and he cannot be explained 
as a deified chief because in Fuegian society one person is 
not superior to another. Herbert Spencer refers to this "big 
man" as a deceased weather doctor, but Lang argues that 
there is no evidence of his ever dying. Further, says Lang, 
we cannot explain this idea by reference to ancestor worship 
because there is no evidence of such among the Fuegians. In 
these and other cases argues Lang, it is difficult to find 
evidence to support the standard anthropological view that 
the conception of a supreme moral being developed from the 
idea of the ghost of an ancestor. 
According to Lang, although we do not find among the 
most primitive peoples an abstract monotheistic conception 
of god, there is evidence of belief in a super creative, 
powerful and moral being. Further this belief is often 
found in juxtaposition with belief in worshipped ghosts, 
totems and fetisches. He recognizes, however, that in some 
higher forms of material culture the belief in a supreme 
moral being is displaced by mobs of ghosts and spirits who 
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attract persons' adoration, who help persons, who often are 
selfish and cruel and who respond to sacrifices including 
human sacrifices. Lang calls this a degeneration of 
religion, an explanation which is foreign to the standard 
view because on that view the moral element in primitive 
religion is not acknowledged. 
If there is, as Lang suggests, a degeneration from a 
higher moral form of religion, how can this be explained? 
According to Lang, animism, once developed, created a 
powerful attraction for natural or sinful man. The supreme 
moral being does not favor one person or tribe over another 
and cannot be tempted to do so as a reward for gifts and 
sacrifices. Thus men and women went in search of useful 
ghost-gods and fetisches which would respond to their 
particular wants and desires. As a result, the higher meral 
god was neglected or came to be thought of as one deity 
among others. Myth making, itself an irrational activity and 
a product of animism according to Lang, is part of this 
process of setting aside the more noble religious ideas of 
primitive persons. 
Material culture continued to develop during this period 
of the degeneration of religion but now the fortunes of the 
state and a rich and powerful clergy were bound up with the 
continuation of animism and the relatively non-moral systems 
in Greece and Rome. According to Lang, it would take the 
moral monotheism of Islam or Judaism to overcome this 
degeneration of religion. Just how far these traditions 
moved from animism is suggested in the Biblical prophet's 
saying, "Even though he slay me, yet will I trust in him." 
In Christianity, says Lang, we find a combination of the 
ideas of caring for the good of the soul and man's eternal 
responsibilities with the idea of the righteous and eternal 
god of the prophets of Israel. 
Lang's approach to the Gifford Lectures followed the 
relatively new and still emerging social scientific method 
of investigation and he was criticized by some religious 
leaders for paying insufficient attention to religious 
doctrines. However in general his studies of natural 
religion were believed to lend support to traditional 
theology. The response to Max Muller's Gifford Lectures at 
Glasgow University was in many cases quite different, as we 
shall see. Muller, the German born Oxford philologist, had 
been a candidate for the first Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh 
University when J.H. Stirling was elected. Shortly after 
Stirling was elected to that post Milller wrote to a friend 
that Stirling, a bona fide student of philosophy would tell 
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what natural religion would or could be or should have been. 
MUller, however, thought that the time for this was past and 
that the focus should now be on what religion has been. 
Shortly after the Edinburgh decision had been announced, 
Muller received a letter from Principal Caird inviting him 
to give the lectures at Glasgow. 
Friedrich Max MUller was born in the town of Dessau in 
1823.4 He was sent to the famous Nicholas School of Leipzig 
in 1836 and began his studies as a classical scholar at the 
University of Leipzig in 1841. At Leipzig Muller was 
attracted to the study of philosophy and attended lectures 
of Christian Weisse and Rudolf Hermann Lotze and considered 
himself something of a Hegelian at the time. Following his 
doctoral thesis on Spinoza, Muller went to Berlin University 
where he was attracted by the work of the then elderly 
idealist philosopher, Schelling, who was lecturing on the 
philosophy and mythology of religion. From these thinkers 
Muller learned to think of the Bible as a historical text to 
be treated in accordance with the same critical principles 
that were used in studying other ancient books including the 
sacred texts of the East. 
Having become convinced of the importance of the 
Rig-veda to the study of all mythological and religious 
theories, MUller went to Paris to attend Burnour's lectures 
and to begin to copy and collate the manuscripts of the Veda 
and its commentaries. His interests in these texts and his 
study of Sanskrit coincided with a rising western interest 
in India. But Muller's interest in language was controlled 
by a philosophical thesis, that the study of language would 
help understand the prehistory of the human mind and the 
intellectual connections among the many peoples of the world. 
Subsequent to a trip to the East India House in England 
to collate some manuscripts, the East India Company 
entrusted to Muller the publication of the Rig-veda. Mliller 
settled in Oxford to do this work while lecturing on modern 
literature and language, devoting his leisure time to the 
study of philology. By the time of his Gifford Lectures 
Muller dominated much of the work being done in the history 
of religions. In the published version of his first series of 
Gifford Lectures, Natural Religion, Muller says that he will 
bring to the topic of natural theology the newest of the 
sciences, the science of religion. He describes this as a 
science which consists in a careful collation of the facts 
of religion, a comparison of religion in terms of their 
likenesses and differences, and an effort to discover the 
nature, origin and purpose of religion. 
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Muller's approach to the origins of religion is rooted 
in his understanding of what he called the science of 
language. In this approach we take languages as we find 
them, trace them back to their earliest forms, classify them 
and then analyze them until we arrive at root elements which 
can be analyzed no further. These root elements form for 
MUller the ultimate facts on which the study of religions is 
based. Then in tracing the development of words, we discover 
stages where meanings evolve leading through mythology to 
religion. Using this method MUller attempts to discover what 
is peculiar to each religion and what is common to all with 
the conviction that what is common to all constitutes the 
essence of religion. 
Muller delayed his second course of lectures until 
February 1890 and following these lectures he was elected to 
a second two courses of lectures. These lectures were 
published under the titles, Physical Religion (1891), 
Anthropological Religion (1892), and Psychological Religion 
(1903). Natural Religion was understood to be of an 
introductory nature and fell into three divisions: (1) The 
definition of natural religion (2) The method for studying 
natural religion (3) The material available for studying 
natural religion. The first lectures then can be seen as a 
prologomena to the future lectures. In Physical Religion 
MUller studies different names derived from nature to refer 
to what lies beyond the limits of nature. Anthropological 
Religion is concerned with evidence of the superhuman in 
relation to parents and ancestors. And Psychological 
Religion is concerned with the sense of otherness or beyond 
associated with experiences of the self. In this essay our 
focus is primarily on Muller's first set of Gifford Lectures. 
The first task in Natural Religion is that of 
determining what can be called religion. Muller was 
convinced that religious knowledge like all knowledge was 
rooted in sensations. Even Kant who had defended the place 
of pure reason over against the tendencies of Locke and 
Hume, had argued that apart from sensation all concepts 
would be empty. Knowledge, according to MUller, had to be 
understood in terms of sensations, precepts, concepts and 
names, four distinguishable albeit not separable phases of 
knowledge. In thinking we deal with names which embody our 
concepts but our concepts are rooted in percepts and our 
percepts in sensation. In this way Muller aligned himself 
with the empiricists of the age. According to Muller this 
process belongs to the early stage of development of the 
human mind as well as to our own thinking. Thus in learning 
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language, in learning the names of things, we are part of a 
cumulative history. Through language we are linked to the 
past. 
One characteristic is said to be in common in all our 
percepts and hence in all our concepts and names. Our 
percepts refer to definite or finite objects and this is the 
case whether we are referring to material objects, to other 
persons or to ourselves as self-conscious beings. Implicit 
in this sense of finiteness, however, is a sense of the 
beyond or the infinite, a feeling of the beyond in the 
presence of the finite object. This sense of the beyond is 
said to be the most primitive and fertile source of our 
mythological and religious ideas but only over time did it 
emerge as the concept of the Infinite or Supreme Being. 
When, for example, the early Vedic poet praised the dawn, he 
did not have in mind the later abstract concept of Infinite 
Being, but he did intend to refer to something beyond the 
definite object dawn, to refer to something within or behind 
the dawn which reappeared day after day. In a related way, 
primitive man sensed a beyond or an otherness in other 
persons, call it breath, spirit or mind, and this led to the 
worship of deceased ancestors. And with reference to self-
consciousness, there was a sense of the infinite which was 
expressed in terms of spirit or soul, an independent agent 
of power. In nature, man and self, then, we find references 
to the infinite and each of these is said to contribute to 
the development of what is called religion. 
In the fuller sense, however, religion is said to 
consist "jn the perception of the infinite under such 
manifestations as are able to influence the moral character 
of men."s Contrary to the findings of Lang, Muller did not 
believe that religion in this sense could be found among 
primitive peoples. But he did hold that to the extent that 
mythology gets beyond the mere naming of powers and begins 
to speak of promise and sacrifice, it is on the threshold of 
religion. To the extent that limen begin to feel constrained 
to do what they do not like to do, or to abstain from what 
they would like to do, for the sake of some unknown powers 
which they have discovered behind the storm and the sky, or 
the sun or the moon, they are at least on religious 
ground."6 
If this is what is meant by religion, how are we to 
study it? Natural theology understood as an effort to 
establish logical arguments for the existence of God had on 
Muller's view been discredited by critics. Muller believed 
with John Caird that at best the traditional arguments 
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demonstrated an implicit logic of religion tracing the steps 
by which the mind rises to consciousness of god. But MUller 
adds to this what he calls a logic of facts or a logic of 
history where one can show the mind to rise gradually and 
irresistably to the idea of god in the history of religion. 
"The true object of the Historical School," he wrote, "is to 
connect the present with the past, to interpret the present 
by the past, and to discover if possible the solution of our 
present difficulties by tracing them back to the causes from 
which they arose."7 
Language, mythology, customs and laws and the Sacred 
Books of the religions are the resources for the study of 
this history. But language, the words in which our concepts 
and hence our precepts and sensations are expressed, 
provides for Muller the fundamental key. A study of words 
shows that our primitive relation to the world was not one 
of a subject standing over against an object. Words were 
originally deeds, creative acts calling into life concepts 
that did not previously exist. Initially man spoke of the 
consciousness of his own action. He might speak of himself 
as a striker or a digger and other beings like himself were 
spoken of in comparable ways. Animals were also treated as 
actions. Thus the word, horse, meant quick runner and the 
word, mouse, a thief. This relation to animals is preserved 
in animal fables. The word for river meant running here and 
the word for tree meant splitting here. In this so-called 
dynamic or dramatic stage in the development of language 
argues Miiller, we find the key to animism. When persons 
wished to speak of what we would call objects, they did so 
in terms of the action roots of language. What we today 
think of as objects set over against us were first named in 
action language and in time things were talked about by 
analogy with human action and took on personal forms. 
Myth, argues Muller, stands second only to language as a 
resource for studying the origins of religion and myth is 
said to be an inevitable stage in the development of 
language. The original meaning of the word, dawn, for 
example, was shining there, and the early formers of 
language would speak of dawn fleeing, wakening, sleeping and 
so on. Here we have the inevitable development of myth. 
Since dawn is followed by the sun, the sun becomes the 
follower, the lover, the daughter or perhaps even a veiled 
bride if she appeared in the clouds. Through such examples 
we can understand the emergence of myth but can also 
understand how myth may contain the germ of religion. The 
dawn may be said to be always the same, always returning, 
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never dying, immortal. And once described as immortal dawn 
may take on other religious attributes. 
Language, then, may be said to lead to myth and from 
myth to religion. And the study of the roots of language 
helps us to identify and compare the different deities. This 
is done by tracing the origins of the names of various 
deities to see whether or not they originate in the same 
name. Muller was looking for the most scientific or exact 
way of studying the origins of religion and he believed that 
it is the name alone which gives continuity through the 
centuries, enables one to distinguish one deity from another 
and allows one to relate the mythological and religous 
ideas of cultures otherwise far distant from each other. 
In studying the language and myths as well as the 
customs, laws and Sacred Books of the religions we learn that 
religion is not created de-novo, that religion is part of a 
long historical process. Just as laws existed before codes 
of laws, so religion existed before Sacred Books. This, 
according to Muller, is forgotten or overlooked when codes, 
laws or Sacred Books become fetisches requiring absolute 
obedience. Historical or revealed religions rest on the 
foundation of natural religon and the failure to recognize 
this is said to be one of the principal reasons for the kind 
of aggressive unbelief which attacks religion from all 
sides. 
MUller's first lectures were well attended and the 
audience included students, faculty, ministers and persons 
from the community. The Glasgow student paper spoke highly 
of his lectures and the invitation to give a second two year 
course of lectures is an indication of faculty support for 
his work. Although one critic complained that Muller had 
found something good in every religion except Christianity, 
there was little public outcry against Muller's first set of 
lectures. As time went on, however, animosity from some of 
the Churches increased and he was accused by some ministers 
at a meeting of the Established Presbytery of Glasgow of 
spreading pantheistic and infidel views. Although Muller was 
for the most part defended by the scholars and the 
newspapers, the criticism was significant enough that Muller 
wrote a defence of his position in the Preface to the third 
volume of his lectures. That defence focused primarily on 
the question of his attitude toward the miraculous. 
At Edinburgh, the first Gifford Lecturer was J. 
Hutchison Stirling. That he was invited to be a Gifford 
Lecturer was itself symbolic of an important change that was 
taking place in British philosophy during the last quarter 
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of the nineteenth century. In the 1877 edition of Recent 
British Philosophy, first published in 1865, David Masson 
wrote the following: 
On the whole, my impression is that the 
struggle in Systematic British Philosophy, apart from 
Didactic Theology, is not now any longer, as it was in 
1865, between Hamilton's System of Transcendental 
Realism plus a Metaphysical Agnosticism relieved by 
strenuous faith, and Mill's System of Empirical 
Idealism plus a Metaphysical Agnosticism, relieved by 
a slight reserve of possibility for Paley after all, 
but between Mr. Spencer's Philosophy of a Real and 
Knowable Cosmical Evolution blocked off from an 
Unknowable Absolute, and some less organized 
Idealistic Philosophy,described as British Hegelianism.s 
Until the second half of the nineteenth century, Hegel was 
all but unknown to philosophers in Britain. German Idealism 
first began to make its appearance through the literary 
works of Coleridge, Emerson and Carlyle. And there was a 
group of younger philosophers and theologians growing up in 
the 1850s and 1860s that was unattracted to either the 
rigid orthodoxies of the Churches or the empirical and 
agnostic philosophies of the day. For many of these, the 
literary works of the idealists provided sustenance. Stirling 
was one of the earlier of these persons who would help bring 
about the kind of Neo-Hegelianism that would flourish 
particularly at the University of Glasgow and Balliol 
College, Oxford in the 1880s and I 890s. This movement would 
also spread quickly to the United States. 
Stirling, born in Glasgow in 1820, never held a 
University position.9 He was a candidate for the Chair of 
Moral Philosophy at Glasgow in 1866 when Edward Caird, a 
Scotsman trained at Balliol College was appointed. Caird was 
fifteen years younger than Stirling and did not yet have an 
established reputation. But he would become in time the most 
important of the Scottish Neo-Hegelians. Stirling was a 
candidate for a similar post at Edinburgh in 1868 and had the 
support of Carlyle and Emerson, but again he was 
unsuccessfuL Stirling had written to John Stuart Mill 
requesting a testimonial for the positon at Edinburgh, but 
Mill, who spoke well of Stirling's work on Hegel, declined to 
support him on the grounds that he did not "think the study 
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of Hegel would have a salutary effect on the 'immature minds 
of university students' .,,10 
Stirling had taken his first degree at Glasgow where he 
won first prize in moral philosophy. But he was little 
motivated by the Scottish Common Sense Tradition which 
informed the work of his teacher, Fleming. In 1842 Stirling 
graduated from the College of Surgeons at Edinburgh 
University and for some years practiced as a surgeon in 
Wales. During this period he wrote a number of poems and 
essays which showed among other things his great admiration 
and sympathy for the work of Carlyle. At the death of his 
father in 1851, Stirling inherited a sum sufficient to 
enable him and his family to live completely without 
employment. He took advantage of this to study at the 
Sorbo nne and in 1856 he and his family moved to 
Heidelberg where he studied the German language and began to 
read with care the works of HegeL It would be nine years 
before he published The Secret of Hegel but from the 
beginning Stirling was attracted to Hegel's effort to 
reconcile philosophy and Christianity. 
Stirling and his family returned to London in 1857 and 
three years later moved to Edinburgh where he spent his 
remaining years. The publication in 1865 of his two volume 
work, The Secret of Hegel, being the Hegelian System in 
Origin, Principle, Form and Matter, established Stirling's 
reputation and is said by many to have marked the beginning 
of serious study of Hegel in Great Britain. Although some 
critics said that if Stirling knew the secret of Hegel, he 
had been successful in keeping it to himself, the book was 
praised by a leading Hegelian, Edward Caird, who wrote that 
"Hegel was first introduced in the powerful statement of his 
principles by Dr. Hutchison Stirling."n In The Secret, 
Stirling suggests that Hegel's distinction between 
Vorstellungen and Begriffe provides a way forward from crude 
superstitions in religion on the one hand and the critics of 
the Enlightenment on the other hand. And this theme is 
echoed in Stirling's Gifford Lectures published in 1890 as 
Philosophy and Theology. 
By contrast with Lang and MUller, Stirling seems 
reluctant to stray very far from the traditional 
understanding of natural theology. Theology, Stirling 
suggests, may be considered to be the logos of God where we 
mean something like a description, narrative or theory of 
God. A natural theology should seek to provide a narrative 
or description of God independent of that which is given 
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expressly in revelation. Stirling suggests, however, that if 
we look to treatises on the subject of natural theology we 
discover "that the attempt in all of them is to demonstrate 
the existence and attributes of the Deity by reason alone, 
in application to nature itself as it appears within us or 
without US."12 He admits that natural theology understood 
as a consideration of the arguments for the existence of God 
has for some years been set aside and he admits that one who 
takes them up again runs the risk of being regarded as a 
fossil. But he suggests that little attention has been given 
to the historical development of the traditional arguments 
and that a treatment of the arguments in the context of 
their history would conform to the expectations of Lord 
Gifford and avoid an exercise that is merely antiquated. 
Stirling spends much effort in the Gifford Lectures 
tracing the historical development of the arguments for the 
existence of God and criticisms of these arguments. It may 
be said with some justification that the emphasis on 
historical development is itself a Hegelian emphasis and 
that Stirling challenges the tendency in much philosophy of 
the time to separate problems under discussion from an 
understanding of the past. But little can be gained here 
from reviewing that history. Of more importance for our 
purposes is the suggestion of a new attitude or approach to 
the relation between philosophy and theology. 
Stirling describes himself as a member of the National 
Church of Scotland, but he distinguishes between the Broad 
Church which emphasizes religious understanding, the High 
Church which emphasizes religious feeling and the low or 
Evangelical Church which attempts to unite understanding and 
feeling. Although he identifies himself with the low Church 
view, he abhores the tendency of each division to be 
intolerant of the other. The essential difference between his 
and the several church views, says Stirling, is that the 
churches possess what is called Vorstellungen or 
representations and he Begri//e or concepts. "What they have 
positively in the feeling or positively in the understanding 
or positively in the union of both, I have reflectively, or 
ideally, or speculatively in reason."13 To put this in other 
terms Stirling argued that the ordinary faithful thought in 
terms of crude pictures and figurative representations, 
often distorted by error and prejudice but that he through 
reason sought to bring the figurative expressions of faith 
to clearer expression and to lay a philosophical foundation 
for them. This theme would be taken up by several later 
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Gifford Lecturers standing in the Neo-Hegelian tradition, 
particularly John and Edward Caird. 
By reason, Stirling did not mean to refer to mere 
intellectual understanding in the Enlightenment sense. The 
Aufkltirung as expressed in the writings of Hobbes, Voltaire, 
Hume and others had tended to dominate discussions of 
religion and was generally critical of it. Enlightenment 
thinkers called into question symbolic representations of 
religious faith, but failed, according to Stirling, to see 
the truth behind them. Mere intellectual understanding has 
to do only with the conditional and the finite and anything 
beyond that is negated or left in the dimension of the 
unknowable. But reason in Hegel's and Stirling's sense refers 
to a speculative effort to bring differences into relation 
and to think the unconditioned and the infinite. 
Many philosophers, according to Stirling, had given up 
Enlightenment attitudes and approaches one hundred years 
earlier, but that so-called advanced form of thinking had 
been taken over in recent years by the general population 
and every hamlet had its Tom Paine. Stirling was anxious to 
overcome the separation between finite and infinite, secular 
and religious, and feeling and understanding that was 
associated with the Enlightenment. Hegel's understanding of 
reason and thought pointed the way forward for him. Stirling 
described his own position as philosophical Christianity and 
said that this was a view which he could hold even if he 
occupied a Christian pulpit. 
Response to Stirling's lectures was somewhat mixed. The 
lecture halls were filled to capacity and a reviewer of the 
published version of the lecturers said in Expository Times 
that this was one of the most suggestive volumes on the 
relation between philosophy and theology that had ever 
appeared in Scotland. By contrast a reviewer in Mind, while 
acknowledging that Stirling said many notable and well 
pointed things, commented that as a whole the lectures 
suffer the sin of irrelevance. Stirling's lectures would 
have been more notable, one suspects, had he chosen to 
develop in more detail what he called philosophical 
Christianity. 
At the time there were those who said that Hegelianism 
was an exotic interest outside the mainstream of Scottish 
philosophy and predicted that it would have a short life. 
This prediction, however, is not supported by the data. 
Whether one argues that Hegel and Idealism in general are 
outside the mainstream of Scottish philosophy or with 
Pringle-Pattison that it is in many ways consisitent with 
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traditional Scottish philosophy, it is clear that the 
Neo-Hegelians were an important force in Scottish philosophy 
and natural theology through the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century and that Idealism in a broader sense was 
very influential in Scottish natural theology at least 
through the first half of the twentieth century.14 
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